Amidst the ongoing conflict between Hezbollah and Israel alongside the Gaza war, the concept of the “rules of the game” has frequently surfaced to explain how both sides have militarily responded to each other, aiming to avoid escalations that could inflict significant damage on both parties.
However, it’s becoming apparent that Israel has repeatedly breached these supposed rules of engagement. This suggests that the termed “dialogue of deterrence” between Hezbollah and Israel, as coined by Israeli scholar Yair Evron in the context of the Israeli-Syrian relationship during the Lebanese civil war, lacks true dialogue and hasn’t effectively deterred Israel.
The “rules of the game” initially emerged in 1996 during Israel’s Grapes of Wrath operation in Lebanon, which concluded with an informal agreement known as the April Understanding. While this agreement aimed to protect civilians on both sides of the Lebanese-Israeli border during Hezbollah’s fight against the Israeli occupation, it essentially legitimized each side’s retaliation for the other’s transgressions.
Following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah maintained that Israel still occupied Lebanese land, particularly the Shebaa Farms, a claim disputed by Israel and the UN. Despite this, Israel tolerated a certain level of Hezbollah attacks in this area, given its contested status.
Whether through the April Understanding or Israel’s flexibility regarding Hezbollah’s operations in the Shebaa Farms, interactions between the parties were governed by realism and acknowledged proportionality. Both sides understood the potential for significant damage if these rules were disregarded, thus adhering to certain red lines.
Since the onset of the Gaza war, these red lines have increasingly been crossed, reflecting Israel’s endeavor to redefine the deterrence equation in its favor, not only in Lebanon but also in Syria.
Approximately a year ago, the pro-Iran “Axis of Resistance” proposed a strategy known as the “unity of arenas,” suggesting collaboration among Iran’s regional proxies to open multiple fronts against Israel in response to perceived Israeli transgressions. This strategy posed immediate risks, including the potential for escalation beyond Gaza.
However, Hezbollah and Iran promptly clarified their reluctance for a major escalation, as it could draw U.S. intervention in support of Israel. Yet, Israel escalated its actions, targeting Hezbollah operatives, Hamas leaders, and Iranian generals, and causing significant destruction in south Lebanon.
Israel’s objective seems to be establishing a lopsided deterrence situation, enabling it to strike harder blows against Hezbollah and Iran without expecting commensurate retaliation, as both parties seek to avoid a major military confrontation.
Should Israel succeed, it could prompt Iran to reassess the “unity of arenas” strategy. However, Hezbollah and Iran are unlikely to accept an imbalanced deterrence equation imposed by Israel, potentially leading to a confrontation to reassert their leverage.
By challenging the long-standing status quo with Israel, Iran understood the risks involved. However, the unpredictability of deterrence dynamics suggests a direct clash between Iran and Israel, possibly through Hezbollah, may be inevitable, as credibility is at stake, leaving little room for concessions.
